place especially often in the border regions of uyezds, because the search for the animal and the bringing of a suit in a strange uyezd is accompanied by difficulties, and with the solidarity of the biis, volost officials, translators and other persons with their constituents, it often ends unsuccessfully. As a result, on the borders of the uyezds boys and girls stand watch (kuzetedi) over the livestock until dawn. Long spears (nayza) with standards are erected before the tents of rich men to frighten away thieves.

162/ Professional thieves have accomplices in the neighboring uyezd for the sale and mutual exchange of stolen goods. They steal from their own volost and from a strange volost without discernment, blindly (kuzi sokur ksidey). But there is a proverb among the Kazakhs: "A thief is like a spoon, the people are like the sea. It is easier for the first to perish from stealing, than for the latter to perish from a thief" (uru kasyk ei tengiz, ol urluk kylyb uzi kuruydi onyng ushun ei kurumaydy).

Since a repetition of robbery is punished more severely by customary law, one who has fallen into stealing sometimes moves to another uyezd where he is not yet known, and in case of another conviction he is punished as though for a first case of stealing.

A thief is often registered in another volost, and in case of a complaint, the volost administrator refuses to find the stolen object on the basis that the thief is not subject to him. Meanwhile the administrator of the volost in which the thief is registered is unable to know anything because he is so far away.

The Tiuri of the Chimkent uyezd also command stealing. They consider it shameful for themselves to engage in agriculture.

The tents of thieves stand alone, or in small groups of 3, 4, or 5 tents. In general the more people there are, the safer it is in the steppe.

Stolen property when it is found is confiscated in favor of the owner, even though it may have already passed into strange hands by means of sale or as a gift. The person in whose possession it is found must produce the one from whom he received it, within a certain period of time. Sometimes the bii requires the person who has the stolen property to ride with the plaintiff to that locality where he hopes to find the seller of this property, and show him to the local authorities. If he finds the actual thief there, he demands from him a reimbursement of his losses. If the accused does not carry out the demand to go to the place where he says the thief is, and asserts that

[139 cont.]
175 collected many geographical notes on Russia as well as on the neighboring countries, he wrote the following in his memoirs (2):

2. See his Rerum Moscoviti/c/arum Commentarii, Basle, 1571, p. 91.

[101] Ad Orientem (from the lands of the realm of Kazad /Kazan/) autem aestivalem Tartaros quos Schibauski et Kozatski vocant, conterminos habent /to the desert East, however, they have neighbors whom the Shibautski and Kozatski call Tartars/. He repeats (3)

3. Ibidem.

almost the same thing in another place. Jenkinson, who was in Bukhara in 1558 and 1559, says that the ruler of Tashkent was [721 181 771] then at war with the Kazaks, a numerous and cruel people, who had no cities and were Moslems (4). It was no doubt on the basis

4. See Collection of Travels to the North, Vol. IV.

of this remark that the lands of the Kirghiz-Kazaks were previously
175 known on our maps in Europe under the name of the lands of the
101 Tatar Kazaks (5). The Russians had known them at least a century

5. Vitzen /Witsen, Nicolaas/, in his Noord and /en/ Oost Tartary, included a map entitled "Asia ex magna orbis terrae descriptione Gerardi mercatoris disumpta, studio et industriâ G.M. junioris; edita anno M.D.LXXXVII." On this map he wrote "Kazaki Tartari" south of the Margus River toward the Caspian Sea.

earlier because of their frequent relations with the Nogais. We find the evidences of this first of all in Herberstein's notes on the Kirghiz-Kazaks, cited above, which he collected in Moscow in

[153 cont.]
175
[166
726] latter, like that of the Volga Kalmuks, did not compare with the power of the Dzungars, nevertheless the lands which the Kazaks had seized belonged to them, and consequently they wished to [721] give no peace to the people who had taken the lands from them. Expeditions for revenge and constant raids were planned for the future and began from this moment. The Cossacks of the Ural, [648] new neighbors of the Kazaks, promised to do the same. It was necessary to seek a defender against so many enemies; it was necessary to ask help from Russia. Perhaps this thought had often come to the minds of the sultans and the wisest elders, but it was difficult not only to put it into execution, but also to propose it to the people. Although we find in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a detailed account of the articles proposed orally in 1726 by Kaibakar, deputy of the Kazaks, who [154] came to ask the protection of Russia for the Little Horde, in the name of the elders Sugur, Iedikbai, Khadjibai, Tiak-Kulybai, and others, nevertheless this communication had no decisive sequel. Judging by the names of the elders who sent Kaibakar, one is forced to think that they were too weak and inconspicuous to win the people over to them, and their mission remained unsuccessful. It is not known what suddenly led them to take this step, but one can be sure that most of the Kazaks were displeased by it. They preferred their barbarous freedom to any kind of order [636 and to dependence upon laws, nor had they forgotten that the ●181] tenets of their religion commanded them to regard the Russians as infidels:

[648 These two obstacles seemed to make the free union of the 636] Kazak hordes with a Christian empire impossible. But unfortunate circumstances, endless dissensions, bloodshed, and the clever mind of Khan Abulkhair changed the inclinations of the people to the point where, after a feeble resistance, he decided to carry out a measure, based on the individual views of a single man, to which he could not have been moved by love of the public weal. I speak here of the voluntary submission of the Kazaks to Empress Anna, an event which took place in 1730, as we shall see below.

[128] Before coming to the description of this revolution, which is so important, we should note here that it forms the line of

[160 cont.]

x 648 662 comprised this empire were exterminated or dispersed, and the lands they had occupied remained deserted.

This event brought about two great advantages for the [726 727] Kazaks. It delivered them from enemies who were as restless as they were dangerous, and it gave them the means of extending their pasture lands over excellent places.

x 648 The Bogdo Khan /emperor/ of China was far from being opposed to their occupying the ravaged steppes of Dzungaria, and indeed he tried to attract them there. To halt raids, he established [712] a fortified line between them and their old lands, which is still called the New Line today.

Thus the Kazak Great Horde, which had been constricted for so long, expanded on all sides to turn the best pasture lands to account. The part of this horde which came closest to the Chinese frontier and mixed with some of the remnants of the Dzungars was punished several times by force of arms for its usual brigandage, and it became subject to China and remains among Chinese subjects to this day. The others, who nomadize a little further west, have retained their independence.

x 648 ● 181 721 Some fractions of these two groups live next to the Buruts, and having often had to fight against them, have become more warlike and dangerous than all the other Kirghiz-Kazaks. We could not enumerate all their continual battles with their neighbors here, but we cannot help mentioning the violent attack they x 648 726 made in 1771 against the Kalmuk Torguts, who were fleeing from Russia under the command of the famous Ubashi.

The man who distinguished himself most in this event was Erali, sultan of the Great Horde, who was known in China for his bravery and who received the title of knight or paladin of the [721] court from the Bogdo Khan (1). When he had learned of the

1. We have taken this information [161] on the exploits of this sultan from the Chinese work by Prince Tsichi [Chi Shih?], which is about the flight of the Torguts and was translated into Russian by Lipovtsov.

[157 cont.]
desired to protect and facilitate their trade at Orenburg. The conditions suggested by Djulbars show that he was thinking less about submission than of profiting from the advantages of trade relations, and experience justified this assumption. Djulbars did not swear his loyalty and never even came to the border. The letter patent prepared in Petersburg on July 17, 1739 as a result of his promises still rests today in the archives of the Orenburg Border Commission.

Later the Russian government received several more proposals related to the submission of the Great Horde, but these were made by sultans or individual tribal chiefs whose authority did not extend over the entire horde and who desired the gifts which the Russian sovereigns made to their new subjects more than the protection of the empire.

Besides, if the Great Horde had decided to submit with the Little Horde in 1730, or with its Khan Djulbars in 1738, it would have found great obstacles to the fulfillment of its desire. The contiguity of the Dzungars and the distance of the Great Horde from the Russian frontier would have stopped it. Galdan Tsyren or Cheren, Kungtaidji of the Dzungars, would never have allowed his Kazak neighbors to take such a step, for he sustained a hereditary hatred against them and never allowed an opportunity to escape for oppressing them or avenging the wrongs done to [721] his forefathers. The union of the Middle and the Little Hordes with Russia persuaded him to reduce the Great Horde to a position where it could not follow the example of the others; he attacked it, defeated it, and subjugated it.

This conquest, however, like all victories won over nomadic peoples, could not be a permanent one. Even though the Russian employees who were then (1) in the [158] Kazak steppes said

1. See Lt. Gladyshev's journal preserved in Orenburg at the Border Commission.

that Galdan's new subjects gave him a korsak /steppe fox/ pelt apiece as a sign of their submission, nevertheless misfortune could not destroy their love nor habit of freedom.

[246 cont.]
This same year 200 tents of Turkmen, who had been living with the Kalmuks for a long time, fled beyond the Yaik /Ural River/, and after the Kazaks had allowed to enter their territories they enslaved the fugitives and divided them among themselves.

During the first years of the reign of Catherine, Russia's relations with the Kazaks were directed more than ever toward the two ends which she had in view: the first, to establish settlements in the two hordes; the second, to insure the inviolability of the caravans.

For the first point, it was wished to revive the plan to build a strong city at the mouth of the Emba and to build a house there for Khan Nurali. But since his subjects feared to see the Russians in the middle of their steppes it was ordered to build a camp in the form of a redoubt instead of a fortress, to shelter the fishermen who came into this region. And in order to keep this establishment from even scaring the nomads, it was ordered that a market be opened where they could provide themselves with wheat from the crown at the lowest price. It was also wished to teach them to [247] mow hay and to build sheds for their animals and dwellings for themselves if they asked for it. Likewise orders were repeated to the border authorities to build sheds for the animals and houses for those Kazaks who wished it on the Irtysh River and beyond the Ural. Taking advantage of the consent of a small number of Kazaks, the Siberian authorities, who had the advantage of living in good relations with certain Kazaks, were ordered to build an entire village on the small Kolchakly River and to obtain for it every imaginable advantage. In a word, the government tried every possible means to imbue its nomadic subjects with a taste for sedentary life. But they always had, and still have today, an invincible aversion to it, either as a result of their nomadic life or for fear of losing their savage liberty, which they value above every kind of possession.

For the second goal, the security of trade, it was necessary to seek new means, for 30 years of experience had proven that neither the khans nor the sultans could offer the caravans a sure and inviolable protection over the entire extent of their territories.

[279 cont.]

×648 After this beginning Baron Igelstrom, who felt, on the basis of Syrym's assurances, that the establishment of peace in the Little Horde was inevitable, [280] prepared to build cities, mosques, caravansaries, and schools in the middle of the steppes. [177] He reported this to the Empress and planned to comply in everything with the organization of the provinces of the interior and to the regulations published in Russia on public education.

[181] This gratifying and consoling hope did not last long. By the following year, 1788, it was beginning to weaken, and soon it disappeared completely. The people, who had long been [662 578 643] accustomed to excitement and brigandage, tired of their inactivity and once more began their old disputes, driven from one side by Nurali's kinsmen, from another by Kaip, and from a third by Batyr Syrym. The followers of the latter were the most numerous and the most active. The sultans could have no power over them, as they were no longer respected. The elders [192] chosen to supervise the conduct of the people, as well as the heads of the tribunals, had no authority and dared not give commands, and followed the stream which carried them along.

[721 62] These internal circumstances were joined by others which acted from outside. The Turks, then at war with Russia, sought to incite the Bukharans against the Russians. The Bukharans aroused the Little Horde, and it was to this end that they suggested to Erali, at first, that they help him take back Khan Nurali by force. Later they entered into relations with Syrym and sent him ×648 and those of his line an appeal couched in these terms:

721 771 186 662 "To the brave warriors, beys, and elders, Sarytai bey, Syrym Batyr, Shukurali bey, Sadyrbek, Barak Batyr, Dajdan Batyr, peace and blessing. And now our words. Glory to the most high God! By His holy grace, all our affairs are running smoothly. We have but one sorrow. Not long ago an ambassador came to us from the Turkish sovereign, vicar of God, with a letter informing us that the infidel Russians have assembled from all sides and, in alliance with the seven Christian states, have started to march. [281] Since you live closer to the Russians than we do and, consequently, know better how to fight them, we propose

[292 cont.]
dissensions, came to sell their children in Russian villages, Bukei's subjects not only remained peaceful but also became rich to the point that their herds and studs increased almost tenfold in the course of seven or eight years. It seemed that [293] such an attractive example for every nomadic people should have inspired the Kazaks to follow it, but their love for their savage freedom and their homeland was more powerful than any example.

It is time to return to the history of the Middle Horde, which we interrupted at the moment when Vali, son of Ablai, became khan. Our silence concerning this part of the Kazak people has been due, first, to the uninterrupted continuation of the events which took place in the Little Horde during the last 20 years of the last century, second, to the monotonous calm in the Middle Horde during this period, and third, to the fact that this very calm makes the external relations of the horde with Russia, as well as the events which took place within the horde, unremarkable.

The statement of these reasons no doubt causes every reader to wonder why the Middle Horde enjoyed and still enjoys today more tranquillity than the Little Horde, even though the two hordes are composed of one and the same people. In our opinion two circumstances have produced this difference: the situation of the lands occupied by the two hordes, and the difference in ways, partly arising from this geographical position and partly from other causes. We shall explain ourselves in greater detail.

The Little Horde has its compatriots for neighbors only to the east. In the south it is often attacked by the Khivans, in the north it has the Bashkirs, its irreconcilable enemies, and in the west it has suffered much in the past from the Ural Cossacks. Thus, having had to sustain violent attacks from all sides, it has not been able to remain at peace for long and has grown accustomed to disturbances and to raids into neighboring territories. In addition, the khans are always distinguished for their weakness. The Middle Horde, on the contrary, occupies the lands which have the Little Horde to the west. To the east it has its compatriots of the Great Horde and the establishments of the Chinese border. In the north is the [294] Siberian line, whose inhabitants are

[294 cont.]

very peaceful. To the south there is once again the Great Horde, or the subjects of what is now the khanate of Kokand, including the people of Tashkent, Turkestan, etc., who are little accustomed to war and little inclined to make raids upon the Kazak peoples. With these neighbors, the Middle Horde was exposed only to the attacks of the Bashkirs, who bordered it on the side of the fort of Troitsk, and to those of the Buruts in the south. But the extent to which these peoples could do damage was so small compared to the expanse of its lands, that one must admit the advantages of its geographical position over that of the Little Horde and to conclude therefore that it was much less troubled than the latter from the outside.

Having clarified our first thought, we believe it is also very simple to explain the second. For there is no doubt that a people which is less often obliged to defend itself against outside attack and less frequently prompted to wreak vengeance acquires milder habits than a people which is always doing battle with its enemies. We will note, in addition, that the khans and sultans of the Middle Horde always had more power and influence over their subjects than those of the Little Horde. In this connection the long administration of Ablai, first as sultan and later as khan, was particularly useful.

The Kazaks who followed Ablai became accustomed under him to peace and the obedience which one can expect from a half-savage people, and they remained peaceful under his son Vali, although his khan did not have his father's talent for gaining the general respect. On the other hand, however, he made a show of never seeking the protection of Russia, paid no attention to the demands of the authorities of the Siberian borders, refused to surrender the Turkmen who had fled with the Kalmuks from the government of Astrakhan and who were later held by Ablai, and finally he persecuted the elders who were devoted to Russia. In 1789 a large number of people who were considered [295] his subjects crossed over into Russia with Tugum, sultan of the Great Horde, in order to establish themselves permanently there, and they received lands near the fort of Ust-Kamenogorsk for their settlement.

[307 cont.]
101 localities in the direction of the eastern borders of the [308]
361 Chinese empire. The rest of them occupy the upper parts of the
221 Ishim, a sector of the shores of the Turgai, Kara-Uziek, Syr
619 [Darya], Kuvan, Lap-Su, and Kuk-Su rivers, the vicinity of Lake Ak, and the Ulug and Kichi mountains, etc.

The Kipchak descent line camps on the shores of the Issel, Turgai, Chakiek, Ubagan, Tobol, Ayat, Muyunli, and Uya rivers, opposite the forts of Troitsk, Stepnoi, and Ust-Uisk, and in the Kara-Kum desert, as well as in the districts of Aman-Karagay, Ebelei, Yedis, and Tiriekly.

The camps of the Uvak-Girei descent line are on the Ubagan, Ishim, Uya, Taguzak, Irtysh, Issel, Sary-Su, and Tsui or Chui rivers, as well as in the sands of Ich-Kungur, the vicinity of Lake Kechubay-Charkar, and opposite the part of the line between the forts of Stepnoi and Verkho-Uralsk, as well as opposite the forts of Zverinogolovskoye and Presnogorkovskoye.

The Great Horde

The tribes of which we have spoken camp on the Chui or Tsui, Tala-Su, Ili, Kuk-Su, Karatal, Chirchik, Syr [Darya], and Sara-Su rivers, in the vicinity of the lakes of Kara, Ala, Al-Su, and Anamas and the cities of Kuldja, Kashgar, Kukan /Kokand/, Tashkent, and Turkestan, and in the neighborhood of the Kara-Tau, Tarbagatai, and Chingiz-Tsazan [Chingis-Tau] mountains, as well as in the district called the Seven Rivers /Semirechie/. They are also in other regions near the Chinese border, in the old lands of the Dzungars. Some tribes live in the towns of Tashkent and Turkestan and in the near-by villages.

One part of the Kunkrat descent line moves about in these same areas, while another part camps with the Naimans.

[309] Chapter IV. Way of Life.

233 The Kazak way of life is a faithful image of that of the
181 patriarchs. The sight of a whole nation of shepherds, who live only, so to speak, for their flocks, the settlements or auls which

[309 cont.]

233 disappear from one place to appear a moment later in another,
181 the simplicity of this type of life which is so close to nature:
the whole offers the novelist or poet an interesting spectacle.
Their active imagination sees in the Kazaks the happy and care-
free shepherds of Arcadia, or the peaceful contemporaries of
Abraham. They can delude themselves about the good fortune
of a people which does not know the vices which reign in the
cities and can seek in these lands the subjects of eclogues and
idyls. But the traveler, who is more wary, sees in the Kazaks
only half-savages, like the Scythians of Herodotus, the Mongols
of Chingis, the Bedouins of the present day, the Kurds, the
small peoples on the shores of the Yenisei, and the Hottentots
and other uncivilized races of Africa and Asia. Actually, the
Kazak hordes are close to these peoples, both in their ways and
in the numerous herds from which they draw their only subsistance
and which they follow from place to place with their movable
342 dwellings. The Kazak dwelling is a kibitka, or yurt, in other
words, a hemispheric tent made of a wooden trellis covered with
felt and provided with a large round opening in the upper part,
which is opened and closed at will. This serves as a window and
takes the place of a chimney when a fire is made in the tent.
These tents, which are like those of the Kalmuks in every way,
are from four to eight arshins (1) /2.84 meters to 5.68 meters/

1. An arshin is slightly more than two feet in France.

high, and from [310] eight to fifteen arshins /5.68 to 10.67
meters/ in diameter. The trellis wall is attached by means of
ropes made of horsehair to posts fixed in the ground. The doors
are made of wood and adorned with ornaments made of small bones
which are inlaid. Sometimes a simple piece of felt takes the
place of a door. The ropes which serve to tie and hold the trellis
[353] are usually of wool but of silk among the rich. In summer the
walls are covered on the inside with a kind of curtain woven of
straw and threads of various colors. In very hot weather the felt
is lifted from the bottom, and then these curtains let the fresh air

[310 cont.]

342 in and protect the interior of the tent from dust and the heat of the sun. The tents of ordinary people are of gray felt, and those of the great or the rich of white felt. But some sultans, the most powerful ones in the Middle and the Great Hordes, have theirs covered with red cloth and lined inside with fabrics of silk. The [565] poorest people, on the contrary, substitute mats of tree bark and leaves for the pieces of felt, and sometimes they even use reeds and grass.

352 The far side of the tent, opposite the door, is occupied by [29] chests covered with rugs. These serve for the storage of dresses, [411] robes, and other clothing. Rifles, sabers, bows, arrows, saddles, 415 harnesses, powderhorns, etc. are hung inside the tent, as well as towels, teapots, jugs, tursuks (kinds of sacks of hide), and frequently pieces of smoked horsemeat as well. The ground, which serves as the floor, is covered with rugs or pieces of felt. On these rugs great vases are arranged, kettles, wooden headboards [chevets] on which pillows are placed, and boxes of a special kind which are ornamented in different ways and in which sacks are placed which contain kumiss.

[493 A Kazak assembles and dismantles his tent in half an hour 231] and constantly carries it on the back of a camel to the places where he finds good pasturage and water for his herds. Thus he is more dependent upon his herds and studs than on anything else.

[233 [311] Later we will give a detailed description of their herds. 182] But it should be stated here that this kind of occupation determines all their social obligations and relations, so that no matter how one imagines a Kazak one can only see an armed shepherd in him. And the habit and taste for the pastoral life is the source of all his actions, both moral and physical.

233 The continual travels of the Kazaks and the change of loca-152 tion does not tire them. On the contrary, they find in it a source ● 181 of pleasure and consider themselves lucky not to be attached to the soil. During the summer the nomadic life is really very pleasant, 321 but it is unbearable during the winter. During this season the 132 Kazak, surrounded on all sides by piles of snow, rarely emerge from their tents. There, huddled around the fire (1), they suffer almost

1. In places where there is no wood, they use animal dung for fuel.

[313 cont.]

Chapter V. On the Possibility of Making the Kirghiz-Kazaks Adopt Sedentary Customs.

631 The division of territory, of which we spoke in relation to the
636 camps of each tribe, might cause one to believe it possible to
311 establish each tribe or each descent line on the land it occupies,
177 in fixed positions, since it recalls to a certain point, the idea of territorial property. But this idea vanishes when one comes to consider the nature of the country and the moral inclinations of its inhabitants.

233 The care of the herds and their propagation is, as has been said before, the favorite and cherished occupation of the Kazaks, as well as the source of all their wealth. In order to sustain this
311 branch of economy in the flourishing state in which it is at
181 present, vast pasture lands are indispensable, and considering
579 the inclination of nomadic peoples for brigandage, these pastures cannot have fixed limits, and in addition, they are divided into two classes, summer and winter pastures. An open plain, smooth and rich [314] in fodder, is excellent for the livestock in summer, but during the winter confining hills are necessary, especially for the ewes, to protect them from the winds and storms, and also sand which absorbs moisture and on which, therefore, the snow
222 remains for a shorter time, as well as reeds and heather, which
372 provide good nourishment for the camels and good fuel for the shepherds.

311 This is why every tribe has its winter and summer pastures,
233 the former usually in the south. Thus the Baganaly and the Naimans, who spend the summer on the Ishim or the Turgai rivers, withdraw in winter to the Kuvan-Darya, while the Djappas people leave the market of Troitsk in November to go toward the shores of the Syr [Darya]. The same could be said for many others.
361 It is clear from this that the Kazaks must either have two different
439 camps according to the seasons or reduce the number of their animals. In this last case they would do harm not only to themselves but also to their neighbors, whose trade relations with them have the sole purpose of exchanging livestock.

[314 cont.]

311 On the other hand, it cannot be assumed that all the Kazaks
241 can apply themselves to agriculture, for aside from their aversion for this kind of life, they have too little arable land, as one can see in the geographic section of this work [untranslated]. In addition, even assuming that these nomads did occupy themselves with the cultivation of land, would the products they grew compensate for the reduction of the herds? All the peoples who border
[243] on the Kazak steppes need livestock, and they produce enough grain so that it is always a better bargain for them than grain which could be brought from far away. So that if neither the Russians, nor the Chinese, nor the inhabitants of Kokand, nor the Bukharans, nor the Khivans will pay the Kazaks the price of their labors as agriculturalists, what will the latter have to give them in exchange for the manufactured products which they cannot do without and which they pay for today with livestock?

[175 [315] Let us add to this picture the physical revolutions to
132 which the surface of the Kazak steppe is subject. The Dimas and
312] Bascatis [rivers] which, according to Ptolemy, watered these lands, no longer exist. The Kenderlik [River], which indicated in the Bolshoi Chertezh, is no longer there. The Kizil-Darya, so often discussed by Abulgazi Baiadur Khan and which is still seen on the old maps, has completely disappeared. The Yany-Darya, which was born, so to speak, in our day, has already ceased to flow. The Aksakal-Barby lakes have diminished greatly. The high points of Sari-Bulak and Kuk-Tirnak, which used to be washed by the Aral Sea according to old Kazaks, are now at a distance of eight hours walk away. Many tiny lakes and wells have dried up entirely. Finally, in regions which are completely deprived of water one sees huge ruins which indicate the former existence of a large population. These phenomena are nothing to a nomadic people, because they move their location all the time, but they are destructive for a sedentary people.

● 181 Let us now recall the prejudice which has been implanted, and
152 is unfortunately well fixed, and has spread among the Kazaks, namely that they will lose their freedom (1) the moment they leave

[636 1. The Russian government has built houses
342] for the Kazak sultans (as for Ablai and others),

[315 cont.]

181 152 [636 342]

often as its own expense, and has used every means of persuasion to induce certain individuals among them to settle down, at least to provide an example. But all these efforts have been futile.

[579 627 628 578] their tents to live in houses. Next let us examine the ethical relations of the tribes and descent lines. Vengeance carried out by one individual against another, the participation of their families in it, their auls, their /clan/ divisions, and sometimes their tribes, and the perpetual reprisals which result from this, sometimes require [166] hundreds of families to move away from their dwelling places and to withdraw much farther away, forever, in order to evade the persecutions of their enemies.

721 It is thus that the entire Karakalpak nation, which had lived independently under the orders of its own khans on the [316] shores of the Syr [Darya], lost its existence as a state in the last years of the 18th century and was forced to disperse as a consequence of the frequent attacks of the Kazaks and the acts of vengeance that they carried out to wipe away old injuries.

101 In 1740 a large part of the Middle Horde, with its khan, Abul Mahmet, occupied the eastern shores of the Khobda River. Abulkhair lived most often on the shores of the Syr [Darya] or the Kuvan. This is why he wrote to Nepluev in Orenburg in 1742:

166 "I am with the Little Horde on the Syr [Darya], and the Middle Horde is near you, General." Today it is the opposite. None of the tribes of the Middle Horde are near Orenburg. Several of the auls of the Alimuly descent line in 1821 even came to make their winter camps on the banks of the Ilek, although they had always

578 had them on the Syr [Darya], as a result of internal dissensions, during which their enemies were supported by the khan of Khiva. At the same time several auls which habitually camped near the

361 Russian border withdrew toward the land of Khiva. All this leads

181 us to the conclusion that the present way of life of the Kazaks and

636 the nature of the land they inhabit do not permit them to form

177 permanent establishments, and that for their own advantage as

[316 cont.]

361 well as that of the neighboring states, and especially of Russia,
● 181 it is to be desired that they not change their condition of being
636 rich herders for that of poor farmers, since their steppes seem,
177 as it were, to be made for nomadic peoples. Good order and peace will not be made to reign in their tribes by establishing villages. There will be no success in making them appreciate the fortunate results of peace except in training them in obedience and especially in observing rules of strict equity with regard to them.

/203 cont./

221 (primarily with the well-being of the livestock), but even here
574 he finds time "to see his friends" /tamymichat'/, i.e., to ride from kstau to kstau (winter camp) to visit, eat a great deal, bring and listen to news.

181 The Kirghiz-Kazak are the most cultured people among the Turks wandering in Asia, and there is no doubt that a better future lies before them. Their number is increasing and they are showing themselves to be receptive to cultural advancements.

One may judge the comparative level of culture of the Kirghiz-Kazak in part by the character of their language, by the means and forms they have for expressing their thoughts, by the richness of the folk literature, and finally by the state of development of the arts.

114 Some Russian ethnologists (Patkanov, for example) relate
197 the Kirghiz-Kazak dialect to the eastern group of the Turkic language, while others (Radlov) relate it to the western group, and more precisely to a special form of it -- the Kirghiz (which
212 is spoken by all the Turks in our region). The Kirghiz /Kazak/
195 use the Arabic alphabet, which began to be spread among the
191 Turks of Central Asia in the 8th century along with Islam. Before this (from the 4th century) they had the Syrian alphabet (brought in by Christians of the Nestorian sect). The enigmatic runic writing discovered by archeologists in Eastern Siberia has also been shown to belong to the Turks and not to the ancient Slavs, Finns, Jews, or other peoples, as many thought. A variety of the Syrian alphabet is retained now only among the Mongols and Manchu, while the remaining Turks use the Arabic alphabet.

193 The Turkic language is one of the uninflected languages (having little development of grammatical relations between words). Its structure is based on the building of words, i.e., the grammatical relationship between words is expressed not by changing the original form of the word, but by adding suffixes (affixes) and insertions (infixes) to it. In this the link between the roots and these additions is so weak that all the

StKrader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

BRIEF

The Kazakhs, one of the major Turkic peoples in the USSR, live in a strategic area in the heart of Soviet Central Asia. There are evidences of deep and continuing conflict between their way of life and the policies imposed upon them by the Soviet Communists. This study was intended to describe those sources of conflict and to indicate their implications for psychological warfare. A secondary objective of the study was to determine how well the vulnerabilities of a people inaccessible to direct methods of research can be assessed.

The traditional Kazakh way of life is pastoral nomadism; they abhor the settled farming life. Their customs and values reflect this independent heritage, and the Soviet drive during the 1930's to collectivize the nomads met with resistance. Between 1926 and 1939, the Kazakhs suffered a net population loss of almost one million--nearly one-fourth of their number in 1926. This loss was the result of starvation and disease, mass arrests and liquidations, flight across the border, and migration to neighboring Turkic peoples and to the urban and industrial areas of Siberia, all factors indirectly attributable to the imposition of Soviet control.

The organization of Kazakh society according to kin groups has been an important factor in contact with the Soviets. It has eased Kazakh transition to collective life, since most collective farms comprise single groups of blood relatives, but at the same time the closeness of the family ties has frequently led to the charge of nepotism by the Soviets.

The nativistic revival of Kazakh interest in their traditional heroes and customs was encouraged by the Soviets as a wartime morale measure. This revival--at once political, religious, and cultural in nature--became so strong that the Soviets considered it a threat and have attempted to suppress it. The importance of blood ties to the Kazakhs heightened their resentment of Soviet condemnation of their national heroes, whom they regard also as their ancestors. The Kazakhs' veneration of their past history and culture is fostered by their native religion, a blend of ancestor worship and shamanism. This folk religion is not formally organized. Administratively, the Soviets treat the Kazakhs as Moslems, although it is difficult to say how much Islam has influenced the rural Kazakhs.

The Kazakhs appear to be making only a minimal contribution to important republic activities which the Soviets are trying to encourage--industry and transport, Party and government. One explanation may be that the Kazakhs are not given equal opportunities; there is some evidence that the Slavs regard them as inferiors. Another reason is that the Kazakhs are not coming forward for training and advancement. Apparently they prefer to keep apart from the Slavic population of the republic; this conclusion is supported by the low rate of intermarriage between the two peoples. The Kazakhs appear to be opposed to many aspects of Sovietization, but at present their resistance is largely passive.

The local press proved to be a most useful source of information in the present study. The reports of local reactions and activities in relation to the official Party line provided many indications of strengths and weaknesses, trouble spots and failures. In addition to this source, research methods from many disciplines were combined to utilize all available data and information.

121 reasonably be expected to persist over time and which indicate probable vulnerabilities to psychological warfare.

COMMUNICATIONS

Because psychological warfare depends ultimately upon the ability to communicate, the existing patterns and facilities for communication have been given considerable attention in the report. These data are concerned not only with radio communications, literacy rates, and similar factors of importance in communicating from a distance, but also with motion pictures and book publishing, which are important during consolidation operations. Such scanty data as are available are given on the distribution of ethnic groups in the republic as a whole and within cities, a matter of importance in helping to define the limits of informal or word-of-mouth communication. Even more scanty, but highly important, are the few available indications of the direction and amount of uncontrolled flow of Turkic peoples back and forth between the USSR and Afghanistan, Iran, and other countries.

COLLECTIVIZATION

181 221 Among the many characteristics of Kazakh culture which have stood in the way of successful adaptation to Soviet policy, their centuries-old dedication to a life of pastoral nomadism has consistently created the most acute problems--problems which became disastrous for the Kazakhs during the collectivization drive of the 1930's. For generations [033] the Kazakhs had led their flocks of sheep and goats in a yearly round between winter and summer grazing areas, traveling in bands whose [621] members were united by bonds of kinship and led by the senior men. Like so many nomads they were proud of their way of life and viewed agriculture and the sedentary life it implies as both unmanly and degrading. The small amount of farming which was occasionally done was [462] performed by women, who have always occupied a subordinate position in [560] Kazakh society, and by slaves and the poor. [569]

The determination of the Soviet regime to settle the Kazakhs, along with the other peoples of the USSR, on collective farms met with resistance and cost hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs their livelihood and 198 their lives. The net loss in Kazakh population in the period 1926-1939 [197] amounted to almost one million; if one takes into account the normal [161] increase otherwise to be expected during this time (based on figures for the USSR as a whole) the figure is closer to one and a half million.

Some compromises were made during the later phases of collectivization, but the basic conflict remains and manifests itself in a number of different ways. The Kazakhs are among those affected by a plan for massive cultural change which the Soviets believe will eventually create a society uniformly organized in accordance with "socialist reality." Thus far, however, cultural change in Kazakhstan has failed in many ways to proceed according to plan.

K GA8 reliability is essential for advancement, the Slavs are understandably hesitant to place the Kazakhs in positions of responsibility and trust, whether this involves "family relations" or not. The second reason is that the Kazakhs simply are not coming forward to be trained and promoted. This is seen especially in the virtual absence of Kazakh women in positions of any responsibility. Here Kazakh and Communist values are completely opposite. In theory, if not in practice, Soviet women are considered the equals of men, whereas the Kazakhs, in both theory and actuality, keep their women in a very subordinate status. But it is also apparent that the men themselves are not becoming any more involved than they have to in the activities most emphasized by the Soviets, and where they can they are holding onto their old values and traditional way of life, meeting the Soviet demands with essentially passive resistance.

K [563] K [187] K [154]

It must be presumed that Kazakh participation in Soviet affairs will increase over time under the continuing pressure exerted. Nevertheless, the Sovietization of the Kazakhs remains sufficiently unsatisfactory, after nearly 40 years of effort expended in this direction, to provide assurance that the process is far from complete.

K [177] KN 665

The nonparticipation of Kazakhs in Soviet developments presents a serious dilemma not only for the regime as a whole but also for the local Communist Party. The primary function of the Party in the Soviet system is to inspire or coerce the people to ever greater efforts toward the goals specified by the regime. Although the Party "carries a big stick," and is supported in this by the entire apparatus of the State, including the secret police, it is obvious that coercion alone is not sufficient to maintain a consistently high rate of output in the daily activities of any people. For this reason the Party uses the carrot as well as the stick, and the various devices used to stimulate production and increase enthusiasm for Soviet objectives are, with the majority of USSR citizens, quite effective. Whatever their real feelings toward the regime and its policies, these citizens see no alternative to living within the framework of Soviet society and making their way in accordance with its standards.

KN 665 563 K [154]

The Kazakhs, on the other hand, feel they do have an alternative—their old way of life and its deeply entrenched values, which are still very much alive. This is not the road to riches, but few of them have ever had reason to hope for riches. As a result the Kazakhs generally put forth only the minimum necessary effort. Not only do they have little interest in industry and transport, but their output is consistently below expectations in agriculture and even in herding, their traditional occupation.

Thus the Party, under constant pressure from Moscow to increase output, finds itself equipped with techniques for encouraging production which are not adapted to dealing with a people who do not view their integration into Soviet society as inevitable. There remain only force and coercion, but these cannot be applied steadily enough to be effective with an entire people. When force was tried during the collectivization drive of the 1930's, the result was a net loss in production from which the economy of Kazakhstan has never fully recovered. Actually, the purges of which the western world is aware tend to be directed more toward the overwhelmingly Slavic membership of the Party, caught on the horns of its dilemma, than toward the Kazakhs who are the cause of the difficulty.

Chapter 1

THE SETTING: GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY[1]

KN 131 133

The steppes of Asia form a region in which extremes abound. The steppes themselves are a tremendous sweep of climatically and geographically continuous terrain, broken only by the upthrust of mountain chains in the center—the Altai, the Tian-Shan, and the Pamirs. This mountain complex, one of the highest in the world, divides the eastern steppe from the western. The eastern steppe, which lies between Manchuria and the mountain ranges, comprises western Manchuria, both Inner and Outer Mongolia, northeastern Tibet, and most of Sinkiang. In terms of elevation it is "high steppe," lying mostly between a mile and two miles' altitude (1,500 to 3,000 meters). The western steppe, stretching from the Caspian in the west to the Altai-Pamir chain in the east, is "low steppe," lying for great stretches at or below sea level. Whereas the eastern steppe is populated mostly by Mongols, the western is inhabited predominantly by Turkic peoples.

K 101 181

The Kazakhs take their place among the Turkic peoples of the western or low steppe. They are by tradition (i.e., past occupation and present orientation and preference) a nation of herders. Although today not all of them live the life of pastoral nomadism, the Kazakhs still constitute the single largest traditional herding group in the world.

GEOGRAPHY OF KAZAKHSTAN

KN 131 [101]

The Soviet republic that is named for the Kazakhs, the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic or Kazakhstan, occupies the central and northern parts of the region formerly known as Turkestan (including Russian and Western Turkestan) or Central Asia (see Figure 1). It includes a large portion of the low steppe and covers an area of more than a million square miles (2,744,300 sq. km.).

KN 133 131

The western boundary of Kazakhstan is formed by the Caspian Sea and the marshy lowlands which stretch along the lower Volga between

[1]The non-Russian sources utilized in this study are listed in the annotated bibliography at the end of this report. References to works in this list are designated by the parenthetical inclusion of the bibliography number of the work. Other references are to Russian-language sources; a selected bibliography of such sources is available upon request from the Human Resources Research Office. The methodology used in the study is discussed in Appendix A.

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THE PERIOD 1926-1939

At the end of the 1920's the Soviets decided to collectivize the nomads of Central Asia, by which they meant causing them to settle down in collective farms. The first Five-Year Plan envisaged settling 383,000 of these nomadic households by 1933. By 1930, 50,000 nomadic Kazakh households were so immobilized, but 567,000 out of 829,000 households, or 67 per cent, were still nomadic. During the following year, 95,000 more households were transferred from nomadism to farming and other sedentary occupations. In 1932 an intensive drive was started to collectivize the nomadic herdsmen as well, but without compulsory sedentarization; collectivization no longer meant settling down.

Apparently, many of those nomads who had been sedentarized in the first Five-Year Plan did not remain on the farms. Kazakhs traditionally abhorred farming. They regarded it as woman's work, as work of the poor and of those who could not make a success of herding. For a man to become a farmer meant loss of status, loss of manhood and virility. The Sarts, for example, a farming and trading people of Central Asia composed of former herdsmen, were despised by the nomads. Only half of those households which had been announced as collectivized remained so. In 1934, it was announced that only 76,000 households of the 145,000 noted above had been permanently settled in 1932. Between 1933 and 1935 slightly under 200,000 households were added to this roll, making a total of about one quarter of a million households which had been sedentarized. In addition, there was some movement of nomad households across the border into other republics or into China. In 1935 there were 158,000 fully nomadic Kazakh households, as compared with 567,000 five years earlier.

The total number of those employed in Kazakhstan in 1931 was 495,100, of whom 125,100 were in agriculture. By 1935 the total figure had risen to 585,700, and the agricultural component to 165,800. The total figure rose to about 700,000 in 1937 and to 820,000 in 1940.

There were 16,184 persons employed in industry in Kazakhstan in 1927, of whom 20.8 per cent were Kazakhs. In 1933, the number of industrial workers had risen to 56,484; of these, 23,784, or 42.1 per cent, were Kazakhs. At the end of 1934, the total was 71,627, of whom 29,022 or 40.5 per cent were Kazakhs.

The total population of Kazakhs was reported in 1926 as 3,968,289; in 1939 their number was given as 3,098,764. They had thus lost in absolute terms about 900,000 people between the two censuses, or approximately 22 per cent of their number in 1926. In the same period, the population of the entire USSR had increased by 15.9 per cent. It has been argued that under normal conditions the Kazakh rate of increase would have been higher than the average for the USSR as a whole. (The populations of the neighboring republics of Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, for instance, which are composed of ethnic groups similar to the Kazakhs, have increased at a rate much higher than that of the entire USSR.) At any rate, if the Kazakhs had increased only at the USSR average rate, they would have numbered about 4,500,000 in 1939. Thus their real loss

live as an independent unit, even though they had their own tent; the group was still part of the husband's father's household.[1]

Extensive studies done in the early 1920's by Rudenko describe the family life among Kazakhs of the Middle Horde. In one aul or nomadic village, there were 13 tents in a line. Five of the 13 "belonged" to the head of the aul, and of these three contained women; that is, three were tents of married persons, for women received tents only on marriage. Rich auls were small, with few families; poor auls were large, with many families joining in their poverty. One such poor aul contained 60 families; Samoilovich describes a richer grouping of 505 tents in 100 auls of three to eight tents each.[2]

Very little information is available on the size of households or the extended family. Samoilovich gave 2,408 as the number of individuals living in the 505 tents, or 4.76 per tent.[3] Equating tents with married couples, but also allowing for bachelors and childless couples in some tents, one can infer a high fertility in this particular community. This account is one of the very few detailed demographic pictures of a small community of Kazakhs living in the traditional fashion. It is difficult to generalize from such a description, but one gets a sense of the direction such figures are likely to take.

In Turkic nomad communities there are generally fewer women than men; a ratio of 900 females to 1,000 males exists among Kazakhs. The Kirgiz and the Yakut of Northern Siberia present a similar picture. Among these people, however, men tend to marry late in life, while social norms dictate that women marry early. This is shown by the fact that, in 1926, 41 out of every 1,000 Kazakh males reached the age of 40 unmarried, while only three out of every 1,000 women were still single at 40. More than 75 per cent of the women married by the age of 20; Kazakh men reached that percentage only in the age group 30-34. Hence there is actually a surplus of women seeking marriage, and this allows for a certain amount of polygamy, since a woman will marry a man who already has a wife rather than remain unmarried.

As noted before, the extended family is patriarchal in character; authority is vested in the senior male of the household. All decisions rest with him, and rarely can appeal be made beyond his word. The entire society centers around the father-son axis, the central point of the marriage life and family happiness is the bearing of a son. The son is the assurance that the line will be continued; on a larger scale, this pattern of descent in the paternal line is the web that holds the society together. This is an extreme case of a father-son oriented society. Few of the factors which tend to modify strict patriarchal control in other societies can be seen here. The Chinese and the Japanese have a patrilineal family system, but in these societies, although the father is the center of authority, the mother is the center of a different circle of emotion, one of love and warmth, and the family life involves both circles.

[1] USSR Census 1926, vol. 54.
[2] Rudenko *et al*, 1930, p. 311.
[3] Samoilovich, in Rudenko *et al*, 1930.

Not so the Kazakhs. Among the Kazakhs and related societies, the role of maternal affection is simply not to be found, in the ethnographies or in the native literature. There are autobiographies of Kazakhs, among them that of the novelist Sabit Mukanov, and biographies of Kazakhs by Kazakhs. Nowhere does the theme of a mother's love for her son, nor of the son's affection for his mother, appear. These autobiographies and novels are products of the Soviet era, but there is nothing in the Soviet pattern which rules out the theme of mother love. Similarly, in collections of poems and songs of both the Soviet and the prerevolutionary eras, the idea of mother love rarely appears. These poems and songs celebrate the deeds of past heroes, or the love of a youth for a girl; girl's songs praise the bravery and handsomeness of the lover. The mother is simply missing. If by chance she should appear, it is only as one of a series of family members.

In the Kazakh language, the term of endearment for the mother is not centered on the mother alone; it designates at the same time mother, elder sister, paternal aunt. This could be taken as a symbol of the great force of mother love, so great that it has become generalized to all other closely related elder females. But this possibility must be ruled out in view of the almost complete silence which the Kazakhs maintain regarding the mother and the mother theme.

The novelist Mukhtar Auezov has written two novels about the 19th century Kazakh poet, Abai Kunanbaev. The general theme concerns the formation of the character of this 19th century Kazakh intellectual who turned to Russia for guidance (Abai is the translator into Kazakh of Pushkin's Eugene Onegin). Abai's life is presented in a literary pattern acceptable to the political line of the Soviet Union: the pattern of the daring youth who breaks with the past, overcoming the tyranny of the traditional life and storming toward the new. This theme is popular with the Soviet leadership, for it contains the notion of the friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union—under the aegis of the Great Russians. Abai's father is depicted as a monster of feudal oppression, and Abai is shown in stern revolt against him. Abai's mother appears briefly as part of a dim gallery of forces which are generally passive and favorably disposed toward the hero: the grandmother, the mother, a poetess of the era, Abai's beloved. The beloved is represented as lovable, the poetess as a beautiful singer, and the grandmother as a woman of wisdom—which is in general a male trait. The mother plays a brief, positive role in Abai's youth and then disappears from the novel. She herself is colorless, and the emotion is centered around the grandmother, a figure not of love but of wisdom.[1]

The absence of the mother role and mother love is true of other domains of Kazakh family life and social life generally. There is nothing that counterbalances the father-son orientation of the family and the society. Woman's status, however high it may rise, is inferior to that of the male. As a young girl, the steppe daughter is a "non-person"; she counts for little. She may be betrothed in infancy, in which case

[1]Auezov (3), 1949. See also Krader's doctoral dissertation (78), 1953, chapter 6. Wisner (128) corroborates this analysis of the literary evidence.

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang AI1
Kazak RQ2

S N 563 233 [423] [476]

V. Individualistic and Collectivistic Bents and Traditions

The nomadic society of the Kirghiz, Kazakhs and Mongols shows collectivistic trends insofar as the pastures are always owned collectively and the livestock can be taken care of and protected only cooperatively. In periods of war and uprisings, the livestock had to be protected militarily, which was one reason why the military organization of the nomads, introduced by Chingis Khan, survived up to the twentieth century.

K S 563 181

Here we can say that the nomadic Kirghiz and Kazakh still shows a tremendous martial spirit, especially the Kazakhs who fought the Communists in 1949 and 1950 in a heroic way in spite of the fact that they were outnumbered from the very beginning.

N S 563 181

As a matter of fact, the Mongols show much less martial spirit than neighboring Kirghiz, Kazakh and especially Tibetans, who constantly rise up here and there, becoming a major nuisance for Peking, although they are hopelessly outnumbered by Chinese Communist Troops. Many explorers agree independently that the Mongols, once intrepid, dauntless, unafraid, frightful and terrifying warriors, make now the impression of being inefficient soldiers, timid, downhearted, and discouraged (so Rockhill, Howorth, Tafel, Vladimirtsov, Hedin, Futterer, and Filchner). Russian scholars, above all B. Vladimirtsov in his Le Regime Social Des Mongols, Le feodalisme Nomade, Paris 1948, blame Buddhism for the disappearance of the martial spirit and courage of the Mongols. This opinion is, however, contradicted by the fact that Tibetans, who have been influenced by Buddhism some centuries longer than the Mongols, are well-known as tough and cunning fighters and apparently fearless and daring insurgents.

S N 563 181 971 114

N 563 992

Almost every Tibetan family has at least one son in a monastery. They faithfully pay their tributes to these monasteries where their sons live as novices or monks. The monasteries are the only cultural centers of the nomads. Kumbum might be named as a magnificent example in regard to external architectural beauty as well as internal wealth in respect to its library, printing house, and the spiritual value of its schools and its Lamaistic academies.

S N 563 668 233 [361]

There are many reasons to believe that the Communist regime is determined to abolish nomadism and to make the nomads sedentary or at least semi-sedentary. The first step was the erection of permanent winter sites. The attitude of the nomads toward the regime seems to be ambivalent. The erection of veterinary stations for the livestock and the extension of additional irrigated pastures certainly are measures approved by the nomads but on the other hand the threatening

619 173 643 pattern, both claims were possible in the 19th century. But because of the exigencies of history, specifically, the disunity and lack of rapport among the various segments of Kazakh society, the contradictory claims could never be settled, or even brought face to face.

619 181 173 This very lack of agreement, however, is indicative of a point whose significance cannot be stressed too greatly. These genealogies are not objective history; they serve a quite different end: among the Kazakhs, a learned man or a leader, or a combination of the two, expounded their genealogy to his people, which supplied them with the expression of their mutual relatedness and their existence as a group. If this genealogy is accepted by neighboring clans and related in turn to their own, then the members of all the clans involved have a point of departure in establishing inter-clan relations, involving rights of precedence, recognition of the degree of seniority and attendant prestige, and so forth. Moreover, the fact of acceptance of a clan's genealogy by related clans means the implied acceptance of an even greater genealogy which integrates and helps to form the greater unity among a number of clans. The genealogy is a charter which is expansive and contractive, depending on the demands made of it, the size of the groups, and the degree of consanguineal distance between the groups. And it is the charter whereby groups incorporate themselves into smaller or larger

social bodies.

These are groups in which the oral tradition predominates. The learned elder who expounds their genealogy to his followers and kinsmen has not invented it; he learned it from his father, who learned it from his. The oral tradition is the means whereby the genealogy is transmitted; the oral tradition is the larger genre, the repository of the integrative forces of Kazakh--and Mongol and Turkic--social life generally. The oral tradition includes more than the genealogy alone; it includes, for example, the folk-epic of the Turks and the Mongols. In order to understand what the oral tradition, genealogical and folk-epic, is, one might look to see where it is not: it does not exist among the Chinese. Chinese society has other means than that of the Altaic-speakers of the steppe whereby it has established its existence as such.

The numerical strength of the Botpay clan was a total of 2465 tents or families, or a total of some 10,000 individuals. It was formed of two major or maximal lineages, the Kudaykul, totalling 743 tents, and the Chagatay, totalling 1722 tents. The Kudaykul was in turn composed of three sub-lineages, the Bish-Imsuk, 315 tents; the Alym-Djanys, 221 tents; and the Siirchi, 207 tents. The Chagatay was composed of six minor or sub-lineages: the Isenbay, 275 tents; the Djankoilyk, 330 tents; the Asan-Taylak, 537 tents; the Akcha-Kodjay,

[Little Horde]

596 spective wife's elder male kin is but one aspect of
602 this respect relationship, another being that of the function of the go-between, and the initiation of the betrothal proceedings by the family of the groom, who came as supplicants for the daughter-in-law. Nevertheless, a family did not wish to have daughters, it desired sons, even though it might gain some prestige
9[181] by marrying the daughters off. The emphasis on sons 1/1 is a correlate of the patrilineal orientation of the entire society, its patri-centrism in values.

595 The Kazakh family of the Little Horde, as elsewhere on the steppe, was polygynous if it could afford to be. On the Mangyshlak peninsula at the beginning of the 20th century it was estimated that 50 percent of the marriages were monogamous and the other 50 percent consisted of two wives, although the Kazakhs were permitted as many as five in theory. The motivation for seeking a second wife was accounted to be childlessness[204] and is exemplified in the proverb, "The more mares the more colts."[205] The Kazakhs were fully aware that the solution of one problem, the need for children, precisely, male issue, in turn raised another issue, that of possible conflict between the wives. The wives therefore were kept in separate tents;[206] again, a man rarely married a second wife without the prior consent of the first. 2 1

[204] Karutz, Kirgische Hochzeit, 42.

[205] Altynsarin, 103.

[206] Karutz, loc. cit.

7/1 [cf. especially, cat. 116, AHI Mongolia, p. 478 -- Analyst]
7/2 [for last note cf. cat. 116, AHI Mongolia, p. 482 -- Analyst]

1: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RD2 Cossacks RD2 Kazak RG2

C-K 181 This explanation of the origin of the Asiatic Cossacks holds good when dealing with the European Cossacks, but of course, since the Central Empires of Eastern Europe were more sedentary than the Central Empires of Northern Asia, Cossacks of Eastern Europe were only half nomadic, whilst the Kaizak of Asia were pure nomads. In the ethnic formation of the Kaizak of Asia the Turkic blood predominated over the Tungus and Mongolic, while in the formation of European Cossacks the Slavonic blood predominated over the Turkic. Thus, however different the European and Asiatic "outskirts people" are, they possess three characteristics in common: love of personal freedom, aptitude for nomadic industries, and skill in warfare.

[144]

C. 175 HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.—I shall now pass to the history of European Cossacks, which is much easier to trace, since it is closely bound up with the histories of Russia, of Poland, and, to a lesser degree, of other East-European countries.*

Several stages may be distinguished in the history of the European Cossacks. The *first stage* corresponds to the first State organization in the old Kieff Rus, from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries.

The *second* comprises the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries, and corresponds to the development of the Cossack independent national communities.

The *third* covers the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the neighbouring States tried to subdue the Cossacks, and thus brought about the Cossack wars with Poland and with Russia, which led to a decline in the Cossack national strength, and eventually to their reorganization as the light cavalry of the Russian army (*voiska*).

The *fourth* is the stage of the Cossack cavalry, or *voiska*, in the nineteenth century and until the present war.

To take the *first period*. The idea of using these conquered nomadic people as defensive outposts on the borderland was already known in the days of the old Kieff Rus, in the time of Nestor, and thus existed before the term "Kaizak" came to this region. The first we hear of anything of this nature is in connection with a branch of the Pyechenyegs, the rivals of the Cumans in the invasion of Southern Russia in the twelth century. These Pyechenyegs were subdued by the Rus people, and a part of them, called Chorno-Klobuki, was used for defensive purposes on the borderlands. The Chorno-Klobuki, known of as early as 1162, were some seventy years later (1239) fighting

* M. Hrushevskii, "History of the Ukraine-Rus," Lemberg, 1904 (Ruthenian); A. Jablonowski, "History of the Southern Rus until the Fall of the Polish Commonwealth," 1912 (Polish); V. Sukhorukoff, "Historical Description of the Land of the Don Voiska," 1895 (Russ.); A. Levshin, "Historical and Statistical Account of the Ural Cossacks, 1823" (Russ.); N. Kharuzin, "Information relating to the Cossack Communities on the Don" (Russ.); P. Korolenko, "The Chernomortsy" (Russ.); F. Rawita Gawronski, Bohdan Chmielnicki, 1906-1909 (Polish); N. Rojkoff, "The Cossacks," vol. xxiii., pp. 90-118, of Jelesnoff's Encyclo. (Russ.); A. Suroff, "The Cossacks," vol xiii., pp. 882-894, of Andreevsky's Encyclo., 1895 (Russ.).

A [see pp. 43-45, Category 116 - Analyst]

1: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RD2 Cossacks RD2
Ko.ZOCK Ko.2

C. 433

is still at a primitive and wasteful stage. Then comes the cultivation of wine and tobacco plantations. The Asiatic Cossacks are well known as traders.

000 CONCLUSION.—Having traced the origin of these curious communities, followed their evolution, and seen something of their present state, I should now like to lay before you two momentous problems, one connected with the Kaizak, the other with the Cossacks, the solution of which is of vital importance to Eastern Europe and to Asia.

K. 101

The first problem arises out of the existence, the character, and the circumstances of the Turkic Kaizak (i.e., the Turkic Cossacks). They are a body who, despite their nomadic condition, have an importance not to be lightly estimated, for any cause, either within Russia or without, which has their support will be very considerably strengthened thereby. Numbering from four to five million, by no means thoroughly subjugated by Mongol or by Russian power, this half-nomadic race of the Kaizak, whom, as we saw, the Russians erroneously call Kirghis, represents a considerable fighting force in its own land, since its clan organization still remains strong. Lying between Europe and Asia, its country extends from the shore of the Caspian to Pamir, and is on the route to the fabulously rich mines of Altai and Sayan and the other wealth of Siberia.

K [101]

K 101

The Kaizak may be regarded as an advance-guard to the Turks of Bokhara, Khiva, and other countries of Turkestan, but their sympathies are detached, for although they have much in common with these Turks racially and linguistically, their want of strong feeling for Mahometanism sets them apart. This is hardly surprising, since Islam was only brought to them two centuries ago, and it has never been in them a driving cultural force. On the other hand, they have always been in opposition to the Central Russian Government, an opposition of which the rising of 1916 and its subsequent massacres is a recent proof.* Their relation to the Russian Cossacks has been that of an insubordinate native tribe to a conquering Russian army, and yet Russian Cossacks and Turkic Kaizak have more in common with each other than either have with the Central Russian Government. Wherever Russian Cossacks have settled among Turkic Kaizak, it is the latter who have kept the upper hand, the Russian Cossacks adopting their mode of life and social outlook. In disregarding their essential kinship, and fostering dissension between the Russian and the Turkic Cossacks, the old Russian Government made a grave mistake. Friendly feeling and friendly terms have grown up and been established between the Turkic Kaizak and the progressive element among the Siberian colonists, which is a consideration worth noticing. There are two alternatives before the Kaizak, one of which

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* For a fuller account on the Turkic Kaizak, see M. A. Czaplicka's "Turks of Central Asia," now in preparation (Oxford University Press).

871 somewhere into the midst of the numerous winter camps, and collect the children, almost exclusively boys, for several hours every day. The little girls learn to read and write very rarely, and only at home with their parents.
[876] The instruction consists of learning verses by heart in chorus and in a singsong voice, supplemented by dictation of Tatar phrases. In the instruction there is no unity and no definite rules. As a result it often happens that the pupils of one mullah can make out only with difficulty what is written by the pupils of another, because they have learned ortography by different rules.

674 Moral training. The evidence from juridical statistics for the nomads is very incomplete, because most of the misdemeanors and crimes remain unknown to the authorities due
[186] to the extent of the territory and the mobility of nomadic life. In addition, many crimes are concealed consciously from the Russian administration by the nomad leaders because they consider it a sufficient accounting to settle them in the native manner. Furthermore it cannot be said that justice suffers particularly because of this. In any case the people are satisfied with it and prefer a judgment according to their ancient customs to our criminal or civil court practice, which is definitely inaccesible to their concepts.

181 The character of the Kazakhs has all the qualities of the character of young nations and those, so to speak, not yet formed. In its main features their character is similar to the common Asiatic one, that is, the Kazakh has a conditional honesty and bravery as long

181 as he sees a possibility of success or gain. Vindictiveness also constitutes one of his motives, when he is not inclined to stealing. Most Kazakhs are very cold-blooded in appearance and in general try to seem to be men in
[158] control of their passions. Yet this is a mask for as soon as this false equilibrium is destroyed by something, they are seized by a terrible quick temper and fury sometimes leading to frenzy and raging which spares neither them-
[147] selves nor others. The Kazakhs have a remarkable ability to bear physical pain. Probably this is a consequence of their rough upbringing, which to a still greater degree makes them insensitive to the sufferings of others. In this connection the women form a praiseworthy exception, and in the past more than one unhappy /351/ prisoner was indebted to them for the easing of his fate, and sometimes even for his freedom.

461 As a result of their limited desires the Kazakhs are lazy. The Kazakh works hard only from extreme need, and when his stomach is full and his body clothed, then for the most part he prefers the eastern keif (delightful idleness) to any work.

203 Idleness and boredom have aroused curio-
574 sity in him. The Kazakh not only loves to listen to news, but along with this he has a great inclination to tell about things. Every smallest event or incident, no matter how trifling, gives him an excellent occasion to ride to the nearest aul and relate in great detail his khabar or news. It is self-evident that during this the Kazakh is not averse to adorning it a little. To know some interesting